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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► We plan to interrogate national data on the Scottish 
general population.
 ► We are expanding an existing national pandemic re-
porting platform, which uses anonymised individual 
patient- level data from general practices, hospitals, 
death registry, virology (reverse transcriptase PCR) 
and serology tests to investigate the epidemiology 
of COVID-19 and assess the effectiveness of existing 
or future preventive and treatment measures.
 ► This is an observational study; therefore, insufficient 
adjustment for confounding, either due to insuffi-
ciently granular variable measurement or a lack of 
variable measurement, is a potential concern.
AbStrACt
Introduction Following the emergence of the novel severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV-2) 
in December 2019 and the ensuing COVID-19 pandemic, 
population- level surveillance and rapid assessment of the 
effectiveness of existing or new therapeutic or preventive 
interventions are required to ensure that interventions 
are targeted to those at highest risk of serious illness or 
death from COVID-19. We aim to repurpose and expand 
an existing pandemic reporting platform to determine the 
attack rate of SARS- CoV-2, the uptake and effectiveness 
of any new pandemic vaccine (once available) and any 
protective effect conferred by existing or new antimicrobial 
drugs and other therapies.
Methods and analysis A prospective observational 
cohort will be used to monitor daily/weekly the progress of 
the COVID-19 epidemic and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of therapeutic interventions in approximately 5.4 million 
individuals registered in general practices across Scotland. 
A national linked dataset of patient- level primary care data, 
out- of- hours, hospitalisation, mortality and laboratory data 
will be assembled. The primary outcomes will measure 
association between: (A) laboratory confirmed SARS- 
CoV-2 infection, morbidity and mortality, and demographic, 
socioeconomic and clinical population characteristics; 
and (B) healthcare burden of COVID-19 and demographic, 
socioeconomic and clinical population characteristics. 
The secondary outcomes will estimate: (A) the uptake (for 
vaccines only); (B) effectiveness; and (C) safety of new or 
existing therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials against 
SARS- CoV-2 infection. The association between population 
characteristics and primary outcomes will be assessed via 
multivariate logistic regression models. The effectiveness of 
therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials will be assessed from 
time- dependent Cox models or Poisson regression models. 
Self- controlled study designs will be explored to estimate the 
risk of therapeutic and prophylactic- related adverse events.
Ethics and dissemination We obtained approval from the 
National Research Ethics Service Committee, Southeast 
Scotland 02. The study findings will be presented at 
international conferences and published in peer- reviewed 
journals.
IntroduCtIon
In the last two centuries, six pandemics 
(global epidemics) have emerged due to 
novel influenza and coronavirus strains. 
During the 20th century, influenza caused 
three pandemics (1918–1919, 1957–1958 
and 1968–1969), resulting in millions of 
clinical cases and deaths.1–4 An estimated 
20–50 million deaths were reported during 
the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic. Fewer 
(between 1 million and 4 million deaths) 
were estimated for the 1957–1958 and 1968–
1969 influenza pandemics, respectively.1–4 
The high mortality rates observed in the 20th 
century against the H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2 
influenza viruses were mainly due to lack of 
prophylactic and therapeutic interventions, 
such as influenza vaccines and antiviral medi-
cations.1–4 By comparison, the first pandemic 
of the 21st century arose from a novel coro-
navirus, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS- CoV), which emerged in 2002–2003.5 
SARS caused more than 8000 infections and 
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Figure 1 Flow diagram for EAVE II project. A&E, Accident 
& Emergency; EAVE II, Early pandemic evaluation and 
enhanced surveillance of COVID-19; ECOSS, Electronic 
Communication of Surveillance in Scotland; eDRIS, the 
electronic data research and innovation service; HEPMA, 
Hospital Electronic Prescribing and Medicines Administration; 
ICU, intensive care unit; ISD, Information Services Scotland; 
NHS, National Health Service; PHS, Public Health Scotland; 
RT- PCR, reverse transcriptase PCR; R&D, Research & 
Development; SICSAG, Scottish Intensive Care Society Audit 
Group.
700 deaths globally.2 5 In 2009–2010, the fourth recorded 
influenza pandemic, influenza A (H1N1), emerged in 
Mexico, resulting in more than 200 000 deaths glob-
ally. Approximately 11%–21% of the global population 
was infected.2 6 Previous exposure to seasonal influenza 
vaccination induced little or no cross- reactive antibody 
responses.7 Particularly low immunological protection 
against the virus was observed in the younger population 
(<30 years old) compared with older adults.7
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus—SARS coro-
navirus 2 (SARS- CoV-2)—emerged in Wuhan, China.8 9 
In the space of 4 months, this virus has now spread glob-
ally. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared 
the coronavirus outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern on 30 January 2020 and then a 
pandemic on 11 March 2020, as a result of the worldwide 
spread of the COVID-19 disease.9 As of 3 April 2020, the 
WHO has reported more than 970 000 confirmed infec-
tions globally and over 50 000 deaths.9 The elderly, people 
with underlying medical conditions and people with poor 
immune function and long- term users of immunosuppres-
sive agents are particularly vulnerable to SARS- CoV-2 and 
at risk of severe coronavirus- related illness.8–11 Current 
data suggest that SARS- CoV-2 has a lower mortality rate, 
ranged between 0.25% and 3%, than for SARS- CoV 
(10%) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome- related 
coronavirus (MERS- CoV) (37%), respectively.12 13 It has 
been postulated (using data from case studies) that the 
main driver of disease severity among younger patients 
for COVID-19 are immunopathological lesions, resulting 
from an excessive proinflammatory host response or cyto-
kine storm.14 15 Among older people, an impaired inter-
feron pathway and systemic virus dissemination beyond 
the respiratory tract may lead to severe disease.14 15 The 
absence of immunity from historic exposure to existing 
seasonal vaccination or antiviral therapy also (in compar-
ison with influenza) renders COVID-19 a significant 
global health threat, which demands an urgent response 
from national and international agencies.
Rapid, large observational epidemiological studies are 
now required to identify the epidemiological and clinical 
profile of the COVID-19 pandemic. These studies can also 
be used to estimate the effectiveness of any existing or 
new healthcare interventions, such as vaccines and anti-
viral therapies (eg, the introduction of any new pandemic 
vaccine), where it is unethical and/or not feasible to 
mount more rigorous experimental studies.
Using linked routine sources of primary, secondary, 
mortality and virological/serological testing data, this 
study aims to describe the epidemiology of COVID-19 in 
Scotland and in due course help establish the effective-
ness of existing or new therapeutic interventions against 
the coronavirus that are not subjected to formal clinical 
trials. Specifically, our objectives are to:
Primary objectives 
a. Determine the epidemiological risk factors for in-
fection, morbidity and mortality of COVID-19 (eg, 
laboratory and serology confirmed SARS- CoV-2 infec-
tion in relation to demographic, socioeconomic and 
clinical population characteristics).
b. Determine the healthcare burden of COVID-19 (eg, 
COVID-19 related morbidity and mortality in relation 
to demographic, socioeconomic and clinical popula-
tion characteristics).
Secondary objectives 
a. Measure the uptake of prophylactic interventions (eg, 
vaccines).
b. Estimate the effectiveness of any new or existing pro-
phylactic and therapeutic interventions (eg, new or re-
purposed therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials).
c. Assess the safety of any new or existing of prophylactic 
and therapeutic interventions (eg, new or repurposed 
therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials).
This work will repurpose and expand the hibernated 
Early Estimation of Vaccine and Anti- Viral Effective-
ness (EAVE) project as part of the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR) Pandemic Preparedness 
Research Portfolio16 17 and a proven platform for studies 
on seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral 
assessment.17–21
MEthodS
Study design and population
We will undertake a timely analysis of a large national 
open prospective observational cohort of patients using 
a unique community, hospital and laboratory linked 
dataset. We will seek to extract data on 5.4 million people 
from across Scotland (figure 1). Therefore, our study 
3Simpson CR, et al. BMJ Open 2020;10:e039097. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-039097
Open access
aims to collect data from all residents in Scotland regis-
tered with a general practice, which translates to over 
91% coverage of the Scottish population.21
databases
Individual- level data from general practices will be 
extracted and linked deterministically to secondary and 
laboratory healthcare datasets using the Community 
Health Index (CHI).17 The CHI number is a unique iden-
tifier provided by the National Health Service (NHS) for 
each resident in Scotland registered with a general prac-
tice. A CHI number is also allocated to patients that may 
have no number when present for treatment as the CHI 
number is mandatory for all clinical communications. 
Thus, non- Scotland resident patients and other tempo-
rary residents can also have a CHI number allocated, if 
required; however, wherever possible, temporary patients 
will be excluded from this analysis.22 The linkage of 
the datasets and analysis will take place within a secure 
Trusted Research Environment.17
Primary care
Almost all individuals in Scotland are registered with a 
general practice, which provide free of charge health-
care services. Data from all patients registered in general 
practices will be extracted and studied. The University 
of Edinburgh and Public Health Scotland (PHS) will 
recruit the additional general practices through Albasoft 
Ltd.17–21 Albasoft Ltd is the trusted third party that will 
carry out the data extraction from all general practices 
using the Enhanced Services Contract Reporting Options 
system.17–21 We will also extract data from a network of 
COVID-19 Community Hubs and Assessment Centres 
established by NHS Health Boards across Scotland.23 The 
aim of this network is to provide a direct and rapid route 
of people with COVID-19 symptoms that have worsened 
or not improved after a week. Patients can call NHS 24 for 
an initial assessment and then if needed the call will be 
passed to a telephone community hub, staffed by clinical 
decision makers.23 The clinical decision maker will then 
decide if an appointment for a face- to- face consultation 
at an assessment centre is necessary.23 Previous obser-
vational studies have shown over 91% completeness of 
capture of contacts and accuracy of clinical event coding 
(Read codes) among practices in Scotland.21
Secondary care
The Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR) database will be 
used to derive information for all in- patient hospitalisa-
tions and emergency admissions in Scotland, which is 
maintained by the Information Services Division.24 Specif-
ically, we will use data from the SMR01 record, which is 
an episode- based patient record for all inpatients and day 
cases discharged from non- obstetric and non- psychiatric 
specialties in Scotland.25 Data from the SMR02 record will 
also be used, which is an episode- based patient record 
for all inpatients and day cases from obstetric specialties 
in the NHS Scotland.26 The SMR dataset also contains 
mortality data that derive from the National Records 
of Scotland.27 Regular validation checks are applied to 
the SMR database. The latest data quality assessment of 
these SMR datasets have shown over 90% completeness 
and accuracy in consistency with previous years.28 We will 
also extract and link data on prescribing and administra-
tion of medicines for inpatients that are available from 
Scottish Hospital Electronic Prescribing and Medicines 
Administration systems.29 The study data will also be 
linked with data from patients admitted to adult general 
intensive care units (ICU), which derive from the Scottish 
Intensive Care Society Audit Group (SICSAG) national 
database.30 The database contains detailed information 
on the management of critically ill or injured patients. 
Data are collected from all general ICU and combined 
ICU/high- dependency units (HDUs). Data from more 
than 90% of general HDUs and a number of specialist 
ICUs and HDUs are collected by the database.30
Laboratory and serology data
The Electronic Communication of Surveillance in Scot-
land (ECOSS) system of PHS is a database that holds 
surveillance data on various microorganisms (eg, influ-
enza virus and coronavirus) and infections reported 
from diagnostics and reference laboratories.31 Data on 
laboratory results for all reverse transcriptase PCR (RT- 
PCR) tests carried out in Scotland are being collated by 
ECOSS and can be linked to other data sources.31 Positive 
laboratory swab samples for SARS- CoV-2 will also be sent 
to national sequencing centres where 500 SARS- CoV-2 
genome sequences will be performed.
In a substudy, the West of Scotland Specialist Virology 
Laboratory will collect and store residual sera from 
routine blood tests from patients until the serology test 
becomes available.32 The EAVE study has already stored 
1000 biochemistry samples from a subset of participating 
practices from 2014, demonstrating that a potential mech-
anism for the collection and storage of the residual sera 
works.17 We aim to collect and store serially throughout 
the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. This will be 
used to determine exposure to SARS- CoV-2 and other 
viruses by the presence of antibodies.17
Exposure definitions and potential confounding factors
The following exposure variables will be used in relation 
to the study’s primary outcomes: sex, age, socioeconomic 
status (SES) and clinical at- risk group. SES will be deter-
mined based on the Scottish Multiple Deprivation Index 
(SIMD). The SIMD classification is based on deprivation 
quintiles. Quintile 1 refers to the most deprived and quin-
tile 5 refers to the least deprived. The SIMD is a combi-
nation of 38 indicators of the following seven domains: 
income, employment, health, education, housing, 
geographical access to services and crime.21 Clinical 
at- risk groups refer to individuals with certain underlying 
medical conditions where are at- risk of COVID-19 related 
complications and for whom seasonal influenza vacci-
nation is recommended. The following clinical at- risk 
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conditions will be considered: (A) chronic respiratory 
disease (with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
asthma as subsets); (B) chronic heart disease; (C) chronic 
liver disease; (D) chronic kidney disease; (E) chronic liver 
disease; (F) chronic neurological disease; (G) diabetes 
types 1 and 2; (H) conditions or medications causing 
impaired immune function; (I) pregnancy; (J) asplenia 
or dysfunction of spleen; (K) obesity (body mass index 
(BMI) <20, 20–25, 25–30, 30–39 and ≥40 kg/m2); (L) 
hypertension (subsets controlled/uncontrolled hyper-
tension); (M) tuberculosis and (N) multimorbidity.21 
This list will be updated as more evidence arises within 
the medical literature. The following exposure variables 
will be used in relation to study’s secondary outcomes: 
any new vaccines against SARS- CoV-2 and existing or new 
therapies and antimicrobial medication against COVID-
19. These will be determined once our study data are 
available and any new therapies, vaccines and antimicro-
bials specifically against the SARS- CoV-2 virus have been 
produced.
A number of aforementioned and additional popula-
tion characteristics below will also be used as potential 
confounding factors in relation to the study’s primary 
and secondary outcomes. Charlson Comorbidity Index 
will represent the weighted comorbidity score based on 
secondary care data.17–21 The urban/rural location will be 
determined based on the urban/rural eight- fold classifi-
cation (UR8). The UR8 is the definition of rural areas 
in Scotland: 1 is assigned to large urban areas and 8 is 
assigned to remote rural areas.21 Smoking status will be 
determined and presented into the following four cate-
gories: current smoker, non- smoker, ex- smoker and not 
recorded for patients with no data on smoking.17–21 The 
type of smoking products (eg, vaping products) and 
alcohol use will also be determined, if possible. Previous 
healthcare usage will be used to measure number of 
primary care consultations and secondary care admis-
sions in previous years. The number of prescriptions will 
also be determined for previous years.17–21 General prac-
tice will also be used to account the effect of clustering 
within practices. The effect of population density will also 
be investigated. Additional exposures such as number 
of household members for those with a confirmed 
SARS- CoV-02 infection and daily protective measures will 
also be investigated given the high transmission rate of 
COVID-19.
outcome definitions
The primary outcomes of this study will include: (A) labo-
ratory confirmed SARS- CoV-2; (B) serum from blood 
samples taken from biochemistry tests (or rapid antibody 
tests if available) will be used to determine exposure 
to SARS- CoV-2 infection by the presence of antibodies; 
and (C) SARS- CoV-2 infection related clinical outcomes 
including general practice, COVID-19 centres and out- 
of- hours consultations, hospital admissions including 
secondary bacterial infections and multidrug- resistant 
bacteria associated with these infections, emergency 
admissions, out of hours consultations and deaths. 
Secondary outcomes include: (A) vaccine uptake propor-
tions; (B) prevention and reduction of SARS- CoV-2 
infection- related general practice consultations, hospital 
admissions including secondary bacterial infections, 
emergency admissions, out of hours consultations and 
deaths due to therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials; 
and (C) adverse events related to therapies, for example, 
vaccine, antimicrobial administration or other therapies.
Statistical analysis
Baseline characteristics of all study participants will 
be described in relation to the study’s exposures and 
outcomes of interest. Mean, median, proportions, ORs 
and rate ratios (RRs), together with a measure of disper-
sion will be provided where appropriate to describe 
differences between the various study groups based on 
the nature of each variable. The amount of missing data 
will be described for each variable. Two- tailed hypoth-
eses tests with a 5% significance level will be used for all 
study’s outcomes. All analyses will be carried out using the 
R statistical programming language.17–21
Primary analyses
Epidemiology and healthcare burden of COVID-19
We will determine the epidemiological risk factors such 
as demographic, socioeconomic and clinical population 
characteristics in relation to laboratory and serology 
confirmed SARS- CoV-2 infection. The healthcare burden 
of COVID-19 in terms of morbidity and mortality in rela-
tion to to demographic, socioeconomic and clinical popu-
lation characteristics will also be determined. SARS- CoV-2 
infection will be confirmed via laboratory (RT- PCR) and 
serology testing. Healthcare burden will be measured 
via general practice consultations, out- of- hours consul-
tations, A&E attendances, hospital admissions including 
secondary bacterial infections and deaths. Exposure of 
interest as per our objectives a and b will change over 
time as the medical literature and surveillance reporting 
is continuously updated. Currently, particularly factors 
of interest for Scotland include: age; sex, geograph-
ical location, SES, underlying condition or medication 
and BMI. Analytical techniques including descriptive 
analysis, univariable and multivariable logistic regres-
sion will be used to determine the association between 
different exposure variables and the likelihood (odds) 
of the study’s primary outcomes (SARS- CoV-2 infection, 
morbidity, mortality and healthcare burden). The effect 
of confounders and effect modifiers will be explored 
through causal frameworks generated for each hypoth-
esis,33 with clinical input.
Secondary analyses
Vaccine uptake
Differences in vaccine uptake will be measured in rela-
tion to demographic, socioeconomic and clinical popu-
lation characteristics. As per primary analyses, exposure 
of interest will change over time as the medical literature 
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and surveillance reporting is continuously updated. Key 
sociodemographic and clinical factors will be analysed 
including age, sex, SES and underlying condition. Analyt-
ical techniques including univariable and multivariable 
logistic regression will be used to determine the associ-
ation between different exposure variables and vaccine 
uptake. The effect of confounders and effect modifiers 
will be explored through causal frameworks generated for 
each hypothesis,33 with clinical input. Key confounding 
factors will include age, sex, SES and underlying condi-
tion. The number of individuals that refuse to be vacci-
nated and the reasons for declining vaccination will also 
be investigated, if possible.
Effectiveness of new or existing prophylactic and therapeutic 
interventions
We will assess the effectiveness of any new or repurposed 
therapies, vaccines and antimicrobials against SARS- CoV-2 
related morbidity and mortality such as general practice 
and out- of- hours consultations, hospitalisations including 
secondary bacterial infections, emergency admissions and 
deaths. Exposure of interest (therapies, vaccines and anti-
microbials) will change over time as the medical literature 
and surveillance reporting is continuously updated. The 
proportion of SARS- CoV-2 related clinical outcomes and 
deaths will be estimated between vaccinated and unvacci-
nated cases. Vaccine effectiveness (VE) and 95% CIs will be 
calculated using the formula, VE = (1−risk ratio)*100 for 
unadjusted and adjusted VE estimates. A time- dependent 
Cox model or the equivalent Poisson regression models 
(taking into account the time at risk and the possibility 
of multiple events (not for death)) will provide the RRs 
and 95% CIs of VE for prevention of SARS- CoV-2 related 
clinical outcomes and deaths. Causal frameworks will be 
generated for each hypothesis,33 with clinical input. Key 
confounders for the VE models will include age, sex, SES 
and underlying condition, with vaccination group repre-
senting a time- dependent covariate. In these VE models, 
propensity variables related to vaccine receipt and effect 
modifiers (eg, vaccinations, consultations and hospitalisa-
tion in the previous season, urban/rural status, smoking 
status, Charlson Score and pregnancy) will be used to 
control for the healthy vaccine effect.17 This is in addition 
to the demographic variables, which will always be used.
Similar statistical methods will be used to assess the 
protective effects of therapies and antimicrobials. A 
binary variable of ever/never exposure to therapies/
antimicrobials as an explanatory variable will be included 
in the VE analyses. The therapy/antimicrobial exposure 
will be a second time- dependent exposure for consul-
tation, hospitalisation and death rates analysis. We will 
also consider using a measure of the volume of therapy/
antimicrobial exposure (eg, length or dose of prescrip-
tion) if the data are adequate. Use of therapies/anti-
microbials will be included as a covariate in any of our 
models where primarily assess VE. Alternatively, exposure 
to the vaccine will be included in any of our models where 
primarily assess the effect of therapies/antimicrobials, if 
appropriate. For example, the effect of therapies/antimi-
crobials may be assessed from a period before the vaccine 
becomes available and, in such instances, no adjustment 
needs to be made.
Safety of new or existing prophylactic and therapeutic 
interventions
We will determine any adverse events following the 
administration of new or repurposed therapies, vaccines 
and antimicrobials. Specific therapies, vaccines and anti-
microbials against SARS- CoV-2 will be determined as the 
outbreak unfolds and depending on existing medical 
literature. The risk of adverse events will be estimated 
using self- controlled study designs. The main assump-
tion in these study designs is that in case of an adverse 
event related to prophylactic and therapeutic agent 
exposure, then the occurrence of an adverse event in 
the period after administration is greater than in periods 
in the same patients that are temporally not related to 
prophylactic and therapeutic agent administration.21 The 
risk interval (the period at risk for an adverse outcome) 
and the control interval (the period not at risk for an 
adverse outcome) will be determined separately for each 
outcome.21 Causal frameworks will be generated for each 
hypothesis,33 with clinical input. The main advantage 
of the self- controlled design is the control for all fixed 
individual- level confounding since any comparisons are 
carried out for the same individual rather than between 
exposed and unexposed populations to therapies, 
vaccines or antimicrobials.21 Key confounding and effect 
modifiers will be determined as the outbreak unfolds and 
depending on existing medical literature.
Sample size
Our prospective cohort will be constructed from patients 
registered in all general practices across Scotland with a 
combined list size of 5.4 million people of all ages. Sample 
size calculations to assess vaccine and antiviral effective-
ness against pandemic influenza have been provided in 
previous work.17 Similar sample size calculations are likely 
to be applicable to the current COVID-19 pandemic; 
however, sample size calculations (one per key analysis) 
are dependent on how the COVID-19 outbreak unfolds 
in Scotland. Thus, our power to answer each objective will 
be dependent on the frequency of the relevant outcome. 
Power calculations will be carried out subsequent to the 
first wave of the pandemic.
Patient and public involvement (PPI)
We will convene a virtual panel of PPI members who will 
contribute to the interpretation and dissemination of 
findings.
Ethics and dissemination
This study was approved by the National Research Ethics 
Service Committee, South East Scotland 02. Findings 
from this study will be presented at international confer-
ences and published in peer- reviewed journals. Meta- 
data produced in this study will also become available to 
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Health Data Research UK Gateway through BREATHE – 
The Health Data Research Hub for Respiratory Health. 
Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in 
Epidemiology and RECORD (via the COVID-19 exten-
sion) will be used to guide transparent reporting.
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